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Talking about scientific progress always implies talking about the outcomes of scientific 
research. Most notably since researchers who took part in the development of nuclear 
weapons called for the abolition of their products, the question of scientific responsibility 
has arisen in society and science itself. The thesis is thus focusing on two conflicts in 
science, which appear to be best handled by norms, but on the other hand, are rather not 
amenable to this solution in every aspect.  
The first conflict affects society as a whole and concerns the limits of scientific research and 
the freedom of science, which is guaranteed as a fundamental right in most European 
constitutions and in the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The question concerns the 
dimension of protection to be enjoyed by researchers, both in consideration of the scientific 
progress as a benefit for individuals and mankind and the perils simultaneously resulting out 
of it. A current and controversial example for this conflict is the science of nano-particles, 
which shows great promise in the areas of medicine and engineering. In contrast, their 
development is accompanied by the creeping feelings of society that these materials could 
infiltrate organisms, causing unknown damage like cancer or other genetic modification. 
Another issue in this field is the dual-use problem of research, i.e. the abuse of neutral or 
beneficent intended research results for terrorist or militant purposes.  
A second conflict which is intimately connected with the first one governs the scientific 
system itself, raising the question whether researchers should be bound to ethical values, and 
if so, which ones. The question of professional ethics is prominent in many areas of modern 
society, most recently in the financial branch. The same is true for science, but opinions in 
regard to the specific field of scientific responsibility are twofold. Two scientists involved in 
the development of nuclear bombs gave two different answers in this issue: Carl Friedrich 
von Weizsäcker explained that his experience in research forced him to accept the hindsight 
that science must be responsible for its outcomes. Edward Teller on the other hand, one of 
the developers of the hydrogen bomb, denied this by stating that scientists only produce 
knowledge, responsibility results from the application of that knowledge and must therefore 
be handled by its users or by society and politics.  
 
II. Freedom of Science 
The dissertation scrutinizes the general responsibility of researchers in the early stages of 
their work and how this issue can be governed or influenced by norms. The early stages of 
research mean the cognitive process of questioning scientific issues and planning projects. 
This sphere shall be absolutely free from state interference, according to the fundamental 
right to freedom of science. The German Federal Constitutional Court has made clear that 
this fundamental right (contained in Art. 5 (3) BL) protects all the processes, modes of 
behaviour and decisions based on scientific laws which relate to the search of knowledge, its 
interpretation and distribution. In the same way the Praesidium of the European Convention, 
which drafted the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, declared in its 
explanations that the freedom of science in Art. 13 was deduced primarily from the right to 
freedom of thought and expression. Freedom of science is thus not only a right to express 
one’s scientific opinion in public. It is a freedom of scientific thought and decision-making, 
to protect the individual inner sphere of the researcher and to keep science open-minded 
about different ideas. 
In Germany the freedom of science is granted without written limitations; it is not subject to 
a statutory reservation. Its limitations must hence be deduced from the basic law itself, i.e. 
from competing constitutional interests. In a case concerning scientific responsibility the 
Federal Constitutional Court stated therefore, that a legal obligation to consider every 
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outcome of research could only be justified if such a norm would be interpreted restrictively: 
The relevant outcomes must be reduced to the imperiled competing constitutional interests 
of others. The court stated that a norm which obligated researchers to do so wouldn’t only 
concern a process of cognition in the sole forum internum of researchers like a moral appeal. 
The scientific profession would be subject to publicity, to communication and publication of 
results and scientific opinions. It is therefore observable and verifiable as a matter of fact, 
whether researchers do keep the outcomes of their research in mind or not. As a real legal 
obligation its interference with the individual sphere of researchers must be justified, and 
this would only be possible if the relevant outcomes were limited to important legal goods 
like human dignity, the right to life and physical integrity and the protection of the 
environment.  
 
III. Ethical Codes as an answer to the conflict? 
The occasion to scrutinize ethical codes was found in some recent examples of norms 
concerning scientific responsibility and the outcomes of science. It is arguable if it is 
possible to refer to them as norms in the legal context because they disclaim legal validity 
by calling for voluntary compliance. They are rather titled “rules and recommendations”, 
“ethical codes” or “codes of conduct” and should thus be classified as extra-legal or non-
binding norms at first glance.  
The Max-Planck-Society, a leading promoter of fundamental research in Germany, 
presented one example three years ago with its “Rules and Recommendations for 
Responsible Practices of Freedom and Risks of Science”. A little earlier the “Deutsche 
Forschungsgemeinschaft”, the central, self-governing research funding organization in 
Germany, published a code of conduct concerning the dual-use of pathogenic micro-
organisms and toxins for its evaluation procedure and its promoted researchers. Last but not 
least, in 2008 the European Commission adopted a code of conduct for responsible nano-
sciences and nano-technologies research, attached to a recommendation which doesn’t claim 
legal validity according to Art. 288 (5) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU). There are more examples for such ethical codes, especially by American 
research societies, but the focus of the dissertation is put on the mentioned ones and first of 
all on those by the German research societies.  
By publishing these ethical codes the societies demonstrated their will to adopt an ethos of 
scientific responsibility for themselves as part of their professional ethics. But what does this 
legally mean? It means that every researcher within these societies is bound by the ethical 
opinion of his or her employer, bound by a decision to do or not to do research in their area 
of expertise. To determine though which research should be undertaken is an original 
scientific decision in light of the FCC’s interpretation of Art. 5 (3) BL, and such a 
determination must hence be constitutionally justified.  
 
IV. The legal and practical effects of ethical codes 
One may ask if this conclusion is valid considering the aforementioned non-binding 
character of these ethical codes. At this point the concept of normativity is put in question 
and had to be scrutinized. The problem is well-known, especially in the field of public 
international law where “soft law” is a controversial notion. As the term soft law suggests, a 
non-binding character doesn’t mean that norms cannot influence their addressee’s behavior. 
Depending on the quality and functionality of such norms there can be factual pressure to 
comply with their provisions, resulting from the social conditions or the relative strength of 
an individual. 
According to these criteria a prominent scholar gave the following definition for soft law:  
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“Rules of conduct that are laid down in instruments which have not been attributed legally 
binding force as such, but nevertheless may have certain (indirect) legal effects, and that are 
aimed at and may produce practical effects.” 
The certain legal effects in this context may result from the legal guarantee of freedom of 
science, which has to be taken in regard by such norms. An interference with that freedom 
results from the intended practical effects. This particularly applies to the mechanisms of 
science which I tried to demonstrate on the basis of three factors. 
Firstly, the most important value in the scientific system is reputation, as Niklas Luhmann 
pointed out in his studies. It is a decisive factor for the granting of scientific promotion or 
possibilities of publication. Next to scientific excellence, this value is highly dependent on 
social factors inside the scientific community and one might imagine what influence a 
verdict of unethical research could have on a researcher’s reputation. The loss of reputation 
is admittedly a rather indirect effect. A more direct effect in contrast is the denial of 
scientific promotion as a second factor. The increasing need for public or private 
sponsorship, particularly in natural sciences, is pivotal for the evaluation of such norms 
which indicate unethical behavior. A third factor lastly derives from the mere existence of 
ethical discussion in science and society, since scientific publication media themselves feel 
pressure to require proof of ethical compliance from researchers requesting publication. The 
denial of scientific publication is hence a form of sanction for unethical science. The ability 
to sanction non-compliant behavior tallies with a criterion of legal validity in a positivistic 
discussion. Consequentially, the effect of the disputed norms and their relevance for 
freedom of science are enhanced when they are publicly acknowledged as touchstones of 
ethical science. 
Considering these factors it must be noted that, especially in the scientific area - but not only 
there -, legal validity should thus not be the sole criterion for evaluating normative 
measures, considering their relevance for the guaranteed freedoms of fundamental rights. 
When factual pressure prevents the exercise of a freedom, state organs must intervene since 
they are obliged to protect a freedom from erosion, be it in public or private law. The 
German labor courts as well detected this necessity and are thus scrutinizing private codes of 
conduct with a voluntary character for their relevance for fundamental rights.  
Based on these remarks, a first finding of the thesis will be that the notion of normativity is 
not solely determined by the question of official legal validity. It is furthermore a question 
of factual effect. The guarantee of the various free spheres of life, where citizens enjoy a 
special status which shall be protected by the state, makes it impossible for judicial organs to 
refer to the lack of legal validity to deny judicial review and protection. The final resolution 
of ethical conflicts is thus not to be found in voluntary ethical codes or recommendations 
when these norms factually influence their addressees’ behavior and are contrary to 
constitutional guarantees. Society’s consensus on ethical values until now has been written 
down in constitutional norms, which are certainly in need of interpretation, but these legal 
norms must be considered first and foremost when ethical conflicts shall be resolved that 
might affect those constitutionally guaranteed freedoms. 
 
V. Justification of “ethical” provisions  
The ethical conflict in question here is not a problem of the direct causation of harm to 
others by researchers. It is rather the question whether researchers could be held generally 
accountable for the outcome of their work, even if damages are caused by a third party based 
on the knowledge acquired from science. One may assume this would be a problem of 
causality as German scholars know it from criminal law. However, the production of 
knowledge can not be perceived as causal in the criminal meaning because there are too 
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many acts between the production of knowledge by fundamental research and its harmful 
utilization. The special areas of science in which legislators have already detected a direct 
and identifiable link to endangered goods are already regulated in binding norms, such as 
cloning, atomic research and human experimentation. The ethical field scrutinized here is 
the grey area beyond these direct perils and is part of a rather philosophical discussion. 
So which provisions concerning this grey area could still be established by norms and how 
could the existing ones be justified? Two possible options are left to support researchers in 
their ethical considerations and to serve society’s need for protection: Normative provisions 
interpreting the constitutional framework to the full extent and procedural provisions for 
collective responsibility. 
The missing or hardly detectable link of causality between the production of knowledge and 
the detriment suffered by its consequences cannot restrain legislators from exercising their 
discretion to steer researchers’ behavior in the preferred direction, as long as this decision 
can be constitutionally justified. The justification depends on a weighting of the competing 
constitutional interests, and this weighting must include the criteria of intensity of 
interference and the importance of competing interests. The inclusion of these criteria is 
pivotal for the justification in this issue. The absence of direct causality can only be bridged 
by a decrease of the intensity of the interferences. This is also a reference to a dogmatic 
construction, whose value has to be increased, although the Federal Constitutional Court did 
not consider it in its case law concerning the freedom of science: the essence of fundamental 
rights (“Wesensgehalt”), as written down in Art. 19 (2) BL and Art. 52 (1) of the European 
Charter. The essence of scientific freedom has to be seen, in my view, as part of the inner 
sphere of scientific thought and the ability to put scientific results in question. The necessary 
decrease of intensity and the respect for the essential content can thus only be reached by the 
voluntariness and the soft character of the ethical codes. In my opinion, in the judicial 
context this should be the outer limit for normative provisions tending to any perception of 
an abstract scientific responsibility. The weighting of the competing constitutional interests 
against the weak interference with freedom of science, would hence result in a constitutional 
justification of the provisions in the codes as long as they are narrowly interpreted and 
accurately executed. The important lesson to be learned here is the inclusion of the 
constitutional framework into ethical discourse if the outcomes of such a discourse may 
affect a specific fundamental right like the freedom of science. 
In the European context this was rather ignored by the European Commission, when it 
adopted its code of conduct concerning nano-sciences in 2008. The commission simply 
stated a necessary consideration of ethical values in science without a definition of these 
values. It furthermore asserted a general accountability of researchers for every outcome of 
their projects, linked with monitoring measures and obligations to report on the 
implementation of the code by the member states. Although the protection of the freedom of 
science in European Law is weaker than the German guarantee and although these 
provisions were solely stated as a recommendation, the Commission acted contrary to the 
fundamental right to the freedom of science by handling an ethical discussion without 
respect to the relationship between the fundamental rights. This would be rather 
unproblematic as the code of conduct was adopted before the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
became effective in 2009 as primary law. Yet the following revision of the code should be 
bound by Art. 13 of the Charter. It has to be observed whether the Commission will then 
meet the normative requirements of the Charter. In this respect it could be a minor 





VI. The role of procedure in ethical discourse 
The second and more important role of norms in this context should be the procedural 
support for researchers and the partial shift of responsibility to collective entities. The rules 
by the Max-Planck-Society for example provide a procedure for its researchers to make 
them aware of the ethical implications of their work. Starting from the assistance in 
cognitive operations of individual researchers, pointing out which factors should be 
included, they also establish a multidisciplinary ethics committee consisting of various 
scientists to elaborate recommendations for the execution of a specific project. The latter 
provision realizes a construction which was called for by various philosophers, e.g. Hans 
Jonas and Julian Nida-Rümelin, and is named collective responsibility. It is based on the 
presumption that modern science would be so differentiated and complicated that individual 
researchers couldn’t be held accountable for their contribution to the outcomes. Thus 
responsibility should be assumed in a collective way or at least individual decisions should 
be facilitated by collective assistance. Given that two conditions are met, this would be 
appropriate from the judicial perspective. First, the committee should consist of independent 
scientists from multiple disciplines to avoid influence from outside and to guarantee a full 
range of possible opinions. Second this procedure must be kept in confidence, especially its 
results and recommendations. In spite of the notion of collective responsibility, individual 
persons are still held accountable for their own acts, at least from the perspective of society. 
Every divergence from the recommendations of an ethics committee by researchers would 
be considered as unethical behavior. If these recommendations were disclosed, they hence 
would create factual pressure to comply and would not meet the conditions of sole 
assistance in ethical decisions. It would cut the researcher’s possible options rather than 
assisting him in ethical consideration. Given that the recommendations would be kept in 
confidence scientists would still be able to decide freely. The cognitive process wouldn’t be 
determined in advance and the necessary assistance would yet be given. 
 
VII. Ethical Codes in Public International Law 
In a last step the dissertation scrutinizes the situation in public international law. Due to the 
lack of a freedom of science different mechanisms of legitimation had to be found to 
enhance the applicability of ethical codes. Neither the actually competent United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) nor the International Council 
for Science (ICSU) as a representative non-governmental organization were able to find a 
conclusion about a fundamental right to scientific freedom, since the pressing problems were 
found elsewhere. Nevertheless, it is a basic aim of these organizations to promote ethical 
codes governing science and researchers. Without a promise of scientific autonomy, granted 
by a fundamental right, researchers have no incentive to follow any of these provisions. 
Considering the fundamental issue of soft law in public international law the dissertation 
offers a thesis for an enhancement of legitimation, formed both by substantial and 
procedural provisions. However, first and foremost the governmental and the non-
governmental organizations have to find a way to cooperate in this issue, since only state 
actors and scientific representatives together can implement such non-binding codes in a 
successful and legitimate way.  
 
VIII. Conclusions 
The lessons to be learned for norms in scientific conflicts hence are twofold: On the one 
hand from the judicial perspective norms must comply with the freedom of science and 
therefore binding normative provisions must be restrained in ethical decisions when direct 
causation of harm to constitutionally guaranteed goods is difficult to determine. If soft 
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instruments refer to ethical decisions they must furthermore pay due regard to the 
constitutional framework if the ethical discourse therein shall be transformed into effective 
consequences for researchers. On the other hand the more important role of norms should 
thus be of procedural assistance to scientists. Given that the aforementioned conditions are 
met, norms could promote ethical discourse inside the scientific community, provide 
necessary assistance and alleviate the researcher’s burden of responsibility by passing parts 
of it to the affected institutions or corporations.  
The German tradition of scientific freedom has generated strong protection for researchers 
considering their margin of appreciation in scientific decisions. The European organs 
however could erode the fundamental right in Art. 13 of the European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights from the beginning by maintaining its code of conduct for nano-
sciences. However, the protection of the freedom of science should in contrast be augmented 
if the Union’s aim of creating a free European research area (Art. 179 (1) TFEU) should 
ever by achieved.  
The outcome of the suspected erosion of scientific freedom are illustrated in the chapter 
about public international law, where strong efforts considering the legitimation of the 
codegiving process were identified to be made. Only ethical codes generated in a substantial 
and procedural legitimate way have the possibility to exist within the framework of 
international norms and to influence the national legislation and governance of science. 
